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Learning from My Success and from Others’ Failure:  
Evidence from Minimally Invasive Cardiac Surgery 
 
Abstract 
Learning from past experience is central to an organization’s adaptation and survival. A key dimension of 
prior experience is whether an outcome was successful or unsuccessful. While empirical studies have 
investigated the effects of success and failure in organizational learning, to date the phenomenon has 
received little attention at the individual level. Drawing on attribution theory in psychology, we 
investigate how individuals learn from their own past experiences with both failure and success and from 
the experiences of others. For our empirical analyses, we use ten years of data from 71 cardiothoracic 
surgeons who completed over 6,500 procedures using a new technology for cardiac surgery. We find that 
individuals learn more from their own successes than from their own failures but learn more from the 
failures of others than from others’ successes. We also find that individuals’ prior successes and others’ 
failures can help individuals overcome their inability to learn from their own failures. Together, these 
findings offer both theoretical and practical insights into how individuals learn directly from their prior 
experience and indirectly from the experiences of others. 
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1.  Introduction 
Failure is simply the opportunity to begin again, this time more intelligently. – Henry Ford 
It's fine to celebrate success, but it is more important to heed the lessons of failure. – Bill Gates 
 
The notion that failure is an important component of the learning process is a well-accepted piece of 
conventional wisdom and is also documented in the academic literature (Lapré and Nembhard 2010). 
Research on organizational learning has demonstrated that failure is central to both adaptation and change 
(Kim and Miner 2007; Madsen and Desai 2010). Failure is believed to benefit learning by drawing 
attention to potential or real problems and by stimulating the search for new strategies or approaches 
rather than reinforcing existing ones (Baum and Dahlin 2007; Chuang and Baum 2003). Although 
insightful, to date, this literature has primarily focused on why organizations fail to learn and on what 
strategies they can develop to learn effectively from failure over time (Haunschild and Sullivan 2002). 
However, scholars and managers alike increasingly recognize that learning at the individual level is 
central to the understanding of organizational learning (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011). Despite its 
importance for organizational learning, the question of how individuals learn from failure, as compared to 
success, has received little empirical attention.  
Drawing on attribution theory in psychology (Weiner 1974), in this paper we investigate how 
individuals learn from both failure and success. We focus not only on individuals’ own past experiences,   - 2 -
but also on how the experiences of others influence individuals’ own learning. Whether an individual’s 
past experience resulted in a success or a failure is an important predictor of future performance, as each 
type of experience may alter the individual’s willingness to engage in different improvement activities. 
Prior research argues that success leads to local search – that is, the refining of previous actions – while 
failure leads to non-local search, or more substantial deviation from prior choices (Audia and Goncalo 
2007; Baum and Dahlin 2007). Through failure, an individual can learn what does not work and then 
develop and try a new approach to increase her likelihood of reaching a successful outcome in the future 
(Sitkin 1992; March and Simon 1993). This difference in how past experience is processed has led to 
theoretical work on the greater benefits that may arise from failure rather than success. While empirical 
work supports this view at the organizational level (Madsen and Desai 2010), the same may not be the 
case for individuals. Individuals, in fact, may interpret their prior experiences differently than 
organizations will. 
While failure may be an important source of information for learning, we propose that individuals 
may not rely on it as much as they rely on success when evaluating their own prior experiences. We base 
this prediction on attribution theory, which suggests that individuals tend to attribute their failures to 
external factors (thus not recognizing the role of their actions in such failures) and their successes to 
internal factors (e.g., their effort or ability) (Ross and Nisbett 1991; Gilbert and Malone 1995). One of the 
main assumptions of attribution theory is that people interpret their environment in a way that allows 
them to maintain a positive image of themselves (e.g., as competent and hard-working individuals, 
Weiner 1974). As a result, people explain their successes and failures by attributing them to factors that 
will allow them to feel as good as possible about themselves. When they experience failure, they are 
likely to attribute their own performance deficit not to personal actions or to the effort they exerted on the 
task, but rather to situational factors beyond their control. Thus, they may not learn from their potential 
mistakes and may approach future tasks in ways that are similar to their approach to the same tasks in the 
past. In fact, when applied to motivation and learning, attribution theory suggests that a person’s own 
attributions for success and failure determine how hard the person will work on the task or activity in the 
future (Weiner 1974). When attributions point to internal, controllable factors such as effort, they trigger 
greater motivation than those that point to external, uncontrollable factors such as luck (Bandura 1977). 
Thus, as a result of these biased attributions, individuals are likely to fail to improve as much from their 
own failures as from their own successes.  
Prior research on individual learning finds that people learn not only from their own experiences, 
but also from the experiences of others (e.g., Gino et al. 2010). Attribution theory suggests that the way 
people interpret success and failure will differ when they evaluate the actions of others as compared to 
their own actions. Namely, individuals tend to attribute the failures of others to internal factors (i.e.,   - 3 -
others’ actions, effort, and abilities) and the successes of others to external factors (i.e., situational forces 
beyond their control, such as luck). If an individual attributes another person’s successful outcome to 
factors such as luck or task difficulty, then she may be less willing to devote effort to learning, since these 
factors would be outside her control. But because the same individual is likely to believe that the other 
person’s failure resulted from his effort and actions, then she may exert more effort toward understanding 
what went wrong and to avoiding the problem herself. Thus, we propose that individuals are more likely 
to learn from others’ failures than from others’ successes due to a change in their approach to learning 
(through either a change in effort or in the strategy used to search for knowledge) and to glean more 
knowledge from the former than from the latter. Therefore, by drawing on attribution theory, we examine 
individual performance as a result not only of an individual’s own successes and failures, but also the 
successes and failures of others within the same organization. 
While attribution theory suggests that individuals may learn less from their own failures than 
from their own successes, we wish to examine whether certain types of prior experience may help to 
counteract this effect. To investigate this question, we explore the potential complementary relationship 
between an individual’s prior successful experiences and her prior failure experiences. Prior successful 
experiences may change her willingness and ability to recognize her own responsibility for a failure. 
Additionally, the experiences of others may improve her ability to process knowledge from a personal 
failure. Thus, we also explore whether individual prior successful experience and the prior failure 
experience of others within an organization each interact with individual failure experience to increase the 
rate of learning. 
We test our predictions using a unique dataset on 71 cardiothoracic surgeons who over ten years 
completed more than 6,500 procedures in a new process technology within healthcare: minimally invasive 
cardiac surgery. The setting offers several benefits for our study. First, while our measure of failure, 
patient mortality, is absolute, the cause of failure is often relative given the complex individual (e.g., 
surgeon) and situational (e.g., patient severity) factors that lead to an outcome, thus providing a context 
where attributions can focus on either internal or external factors. Second, studies of learning in 
organizations often examine existing processes that have been completed many times before. Our dataset 
begins close to the rollout of the new procedure, thus allowing us to capture most surgeons’ entire 
learning curves in our market. 
  By drawing on psychological research on attribution theory, the findings of this paper advance 
our understanding of individual learning and provide evidence consistent with our main hypotheses. First, 
we find that an individual’s successful experience is more significantly related to current performance 
improvement than an individual’s failure experience. Second, we find that the failure experience of others 
has a greater positive effect for an individual’s current performance than does the successful experience   - 4 -
of others. Third, we find that individual prior failures and individual prior successes have a 
complementary (i.e., positive) effect on individual current performance. In other words, the rate of 
learning from individual failure increases as an individual’s volume of prior successful experience rises. 
Finally, we also find that individual prior failures and others’ prior failures have a complementary (i.e., 
positive) effect on individual performance. That is, the rate of learning from individual failure increases 
as the volume of prior failure experienced by others within the same organization rises.  
2.  Hypothesis Development 
As competition grows more global and knowledge based, learning in organizations is a key factor that can 
serve as a competitive differentiator (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). Traditionally, the majority of 
studies of learning in organizations either did not distinguish between success and failure or implicitly 
focused on learning from successful past experience (Lapré and Nembhard 2010). However, more 
recently, empirical work finds that organizations do learn from failure (Haunschild and Sullivan 2002; 
Chuang and Baum 2003), both their own failures and the near-failures of other firms (Kim and Miner 
2007), and that such learning positively impacts their survival rates (Ingram and Baum 1997). Previous 
studies also compared the learning gained from success to the learning gained from failure at the 
organizational level and found mixed results. In some cases, learning from success had a stronger effect 
than learning from failure (Baum and Dahlin 2007); in others, the effects of learning from failure 
dominated (Li and Rajagopalan 1997; Madsen and Desai 2010).  
Learning in organizations refers to the improvement of performance “through better knowledge 
and understanding” (Edmondson 2002: 128). Although studies of learning in organizations often focus on 
the cumulative volume of the organization as a means of measuring an organization’s knowledge, it is 
through the actions and interactions of individuals that such knowledge is captured, adapted, and applied 
(Argote and Ingram 2000; Staats 2012). As work grows more specialized and is divided into smaller 
tasks, the role of individuals in organizational learning increases in importance (Argote and Miron-
Spektor 2011; Staats and Gino 2012). By focusing on individuals, we can gain a more nuanced 
understanding of how success and failure lead to either performance improvement or performance 
degradation in organizations.  
As noted by Madsen and Desai (2010), prior success and prior failure may have differential 
effects on both the motivation to learn as well as the knowledge acquired to enable learning. With respect 
to the former, as individuals complete a task, they have a goal or aspiration regarding what constitutes 
satisfactory performance (Locke and Bryan 1967; Greve 1998). If their performance meets or exceeds the 
goal, then they are likely to continue on the same course of action. But if their performance falls below 
the standard (“failure”), they may feel motivated to learn and identify the cause of the failure (Cyert and   - 5 -
March 1963; Locke et al. 1981). The effects of success may be even more insidious for motivation, since 
success increases the likelihood of overconfidence, which may further remove the motivation to learn 
(Gino and Pisano 2011). 
Success and failure may also affect the knowledge that is (or is not) acquired from experience. 
The behavioral theory of the firm posits that individuals in organizations respond with different actions 
after success and failure (Cyert and March 1963; March and Simon 1993). After a success, individuals are 
likely to conclude that they already have the appropriate knowledge needed to understand the situation 
and, as a result, engage in a limited, local search for additional information. Therefore, rather than 
revisiting their existing assumptions, beliefs, and schemas, they are likely to refine them (Lant 1992).  
On the other hand, after failure, individual decision makers are likely to engage in a different kind 
of search. First, they may look for information in new places. This could entail both increased breadth of 
search (e.g., books or new experts) and increased depth (more time spent with each source). Second, 
failure may change the way people process information. Failure reveals that existing ways of operating 
are no longer sufficient or appropriate and that prior assumptions are incorrect (Sitkin 1992). Thus, 
individuals may be more willing to engage in reflection that can improve learning (Argyris and Schön 
1978). Further, by opening themselves up to the idea that the prior schema was flawed, individuals may 
consult information they previously deemed irrelevant (or at least unnecessary) and in doing so create 
new and potentially improved beliefs that will positively affect future performance (Piaget 1963). 
While the prior arguments point toward a stronger effect for learning from failure than from 
success, attribution theory suggests that at the individual level, learning from failure may not be quite so 
straightforward. Research in psychology finds that people strive to understand their own prior experiences 
and those of others by making attributions about events (Heider 1958; Wong and Weiner 1981). For 
example, suppose that an individual reads about a student’s performance on a test and then must judge the 
student’s knowledge and ability in order to decide whether to admit him to a Quizbowl team (Moore et al. 
2010). The individual’s inferences about the information provided to her require accurate attributions of 
the cause-and-effect relationships that led to the outcome. For instance, a student may have received a low 
score on the test after correctly answering only two questions out of ten. However, before concluding that 
the student is not very knowledgeable, the individual making the judgment should consider the difficulty 
of the test and how it may have impacted the student’s ability to answer the questions. An individual’s 
outcomes are jointly determined by both his choices and the situation in which he acts, yet studies 
indicate that people often do not weight these factors appropriately (Jones and Davis 1965). For example, 
while low lighting on a basketball court increases the difficulty of making a shot, one study found that 
shooters randomly assigned to a less-well-lit court were judged less capable than shooters assigned to a 
well-lit court (Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz 1977). And even when people are provided with full   - 6 -
information about a situation (e.g., average score on the test and standard deviation), they still make 
biased attributions of another person’s ability (Moore et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, psychological research on attribution finds that people incorrectly weight the 
individual and situational effects on behavior in systematic ways based on whether they are evaluating 
themselves or someone else (Heider 1958). In particular, when individuals assess their own performance, 
they are likely to overweight situational forces and underweight individual forces, but when they assess 
others’ performance, they do just the opposite: they tend to underweight situational forces and overweight 
individual ones (Gilbert and Malone 1995; Ross 1977).  
In this paper, we examine the question of how attributions affect subsequent performance 
improvement and learning. Research suggests that learning occurs through repeated cycles of action and 
reflection (Argyris and Schön 1978) and that the attributions a person makes will affect her reflection 
process, or lack thereof. Early attribution research in psychology examined how people’s different 
attributions affected their subsequent effort and motivation, and identified four categories of attributions: 
effort, ability, task difficulty, and luck (Weiner 1974). Ability and effort are perceived as causes 
originating within the individual (internal causes); task difficulty and luck are perceived as causes outside 
the individual (external causes). One important dimension on which internal causes differ is their degree 
of controllability: while effort is controllable, ability often is not, as people tend to believe it is innate and 
cannot be changed (Weiner 1979; 1995). The types of attributions people make about the causes of their 
successes and failures influence motivation and effort in subsequent tasks (and thus learning) in different 
ways (Weiner 1974). In achievement contexts, where individuals want to perform well (for instance, 
based on given goals they set for themselves), they tend to attribute their own success to their effort and 
ability. Since they have control over their own effort and actions, these attributions motivate them to exert 
effort in subsequent tasks so that they can continue improving and learning (Weiner 2001). When 
interpreting their own failures, instead, individuals tend to make external attributions, pointing to factors 
that are outside of their direct control (such as luck). As a result, they have a lower motivation to exert 
effort on the same task in the future (Weiner 2001). In fact, believing that factors that one can control 
directly lead to success promotes greater effort and learning, which may help people avoid future failures 
(Bandura 1977). Thus, even though an individual failure experience may contain valuable knowledge, 
without subsequent effort to reflect upon that experience, the potential learning will remain untapped. 
Further, since individuals tend to seek knowledge about themselves in ways designed to yield flattering 
results (Sedikides 1993), even if someone were to engage in reflection after failing, he might seek 
knowledge to explain away the failure. In its most extreme form, failure could lead to worse performance 
because, in an effort to enhance his own self-image, an individual could glean the wrong, misleading 
lessons from the prior experience.    - 7 -
The relationship between attributions and subsequent effort is also likely to affect learning from 
the experience of others. When another person is successful, a focal individual is likely to make an 
external or situational attribution for that success. Attributing the other person’s success to factors such as 
luck or task difficulty may decrease an individual’s willingness to exert additional effort in order to learn 
because these factors are outside his control. By contrast, we may be more likely to learn from the failures 
of others. An individual is likely to believe that another person’s failure was caused by her effort and 
actions. As a result, the individual may exert additional effort to understand what went wrong in the belief 
that she can avoid a similar fate. This is consistent with the concept of self-enhancement motives (Taylor 
and Brown 1988). Because people want to see themselves as capable and successful, and thus seek out 
information consistent with such self-views (Sedikides 1993), they are likely to note and process others’ 
failures so that they can avoid failing in the same ways and suffer from a negative self-evaluation. Given 
that failure may yield valuable knowledge, this also suggests that, in practice, others’ failures may 
generate the most learning of all for an individual. 
Together, these arguments lead to two hypotheses about how individuals learn directly from their 
own prior experiences and indirectly from the experiences of others. First, we predict that individuals will 
learn more from their own successes as compared to their own failures. Second, we predict that 
individuals will learn more from others’ failures than from others’ successes. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1:   The prior successes of an individual have a greater effect on the individual’s 
current performance than do the individuals’ prior failures. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2:   The prior failures of other individuals have a greater effect on an 
individual’s current performance than do the prior successes of others.  
 
As our first hypothesis suggests, attribution theory leads us to predict that individuals will learn 
less from their own failures than from their own successes. What conditions can help to counteract this 
effect and, in so doing, increase learning after an individual’s own failure? To address this question, we 
first consider the role of an individual’s prior successes. We suggest that past experience with individual 
success may create a foundation for an individual to learn more from a recent individual failure. In 
general, one of the reasons people tend to attribute their own failures to external rather than internal 
factors is that failure constitutes a threat to their abilities and positive self-concept. When people have had 
a successful experience, this perceived threat is likely to disappear. As a result, people likely to make less 
self-serving attributions and thus less likely to attribute failure to external factors. Consistent with these 
arguments, Campbell and Sedikides (1999) found that when people experience little self-threat, they are   - 8 -
less likely to make self-serving attributions. This lowered need for self-serving attributions may help an 
individual exert effort after an individual failure in order to attempt to learn. 
Past successful experience may also provide the individual with information that helps her better 
interpret a failure. As an individual gains successful experience, she begins to understand how to 
complete a task and how the different components of the task fit together (Bohn 2005). This underlying 
causal knowledge may increase the learning rate from an individual failure experience. First, when an 
individual understands a given context, she is more likely to recognize a failure for what it is – a gap in 
existing knowledge or practice. When she has a better comprehension of how things work, it will be more 
difficult for her to blame the outcome on the situation (Moore et al. 2010). Not only may prior successful 
experience increase the likelihood of recognizing a failure as an individual responsibility, thus creating 
the motivation to improve, but prior successful experience may also help the individual use such 
knowledge more effectively. After a failure, an individual may look for information in different places. 
Prior successful experience can serve as a guide on where to look (Blume and Franco 2007). Also, when 
an individual engages in reflection, prior successful experience may prove useful, as it provides 
knowledge on what has worked in the past. Combined with the knowledge gained through failure, an 
individual can work through the process of creating and then testing new hypotheses. Finally, research on 
associative learning offers evidence as to why prior success may help individuals respond to failure 
(Sternberg 2003). When failure occurs after a series of successes, it marks a salient deviation that may be 
noticed precisely because of its salience (Taylor and Fiske 1978). Further, the combination of failure and 
success experiences creates the ability to compare knowledge gained in each situation, reducing 
uncertainty in the causal relationships in each case (Morris and Moore 2000). Consistent with this 
argument, at the organization level, Kim et al. (2009) find evidence for a beneficial interaction effect 
between success and a near-failure experience on firm survival. Together, this reasoning leads us to 
hypothesize:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3:   An individual’s prior failures and prior successes have a complementary 
(i.e., positive interaction) effect on the individual’s current performance. 
 
Finally, we consider how the failures of others may affect an individual’s ability to learn from his 
or her own failures. Research has found that salient, distinctive, and visible information facilitates the 
attribution process since such information tends to easily capture attention (Heider 1958; Taylor and Fiske 
1978). As negative events, failures are more vivid and salient than successes (Baumeister et al. 2001). 
Thus, others’ failures are likely to improve one’s ability to learn from personal failure, for this and two 
additional reasons. First, others’ failures change how people internalize their own failures (Wood and   - 9 -
Bandura 1989), triggering a process of reflection that allows people to identify new ways of approaching 
problems. As noted previously, individuals are likely to attribute others’ failures to a lack of effort or 
ability (internal causes). When someone sees others fail, and interprets those failures to others’ actions 
and effort (namely, controllable factors), then she may become more willing to accept responsibility for 
her own personal failures and possibly learn from them. Thus, when people recognize failure as a 
possibility, they become willing to own up to their own actions rather than blaming the situation. 
Others’ failures may also improve individual learning from one’s own failure by creating the 
opportunity for a first-mover advantage.
1 Namely, an individual gains the opportunity to shine by solving 
problems caused by others’ failures. This is consistent with the earlier discussion of self-enhancement as 
when an individual solves a problem that others have she can be placed in a more positive light. Given the 
potential benefits of others’ failures for both an individual’s motivation and her problem-solving and 
information processing, we hypothesize: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4:  An individual’s prior failures and the prior failures of others have a 
complementary (i.e., positive interaction) effect on the individual’s current 
performance.  
 
3. Setting, Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
3.1 Setting  
 
Cardiac care is a high-volume and high-revenue service sector, accounting for one-third of the entire 
patient volume in the United States and over a third of all Medicare spending (AHA 2008). In particular, 
coronary artery disease, a clinical condition in which plaque builds up in the arteries that supply 
oxygenated blood to the heart muscle (or the myocardium), affects millions of individuals. Left untreated, 
this condition can lead to adverse physiological function, angina (chest discomfort), and heart attacks. 
Congestive artery disease is the leading cause of death for men and women in the United States (AHA 
2008).    
One of the most common clinical interventions for congestive artery disease is to bypass the 
blocked vessels using another donor vessel. This procedure, known as coronary artery bypass grafting 
(CABG), has helped millions of patients since its development in the late 1960s. CABG is an invasive 
procedure in which the heart is stopped while the cardiothoracic surgeon performs the grafting procedure. 
Once the vessels have been sutured into place, the heart is then restarted.  The process of stopping and 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.   - 10 -
restarting the heart has been shown to adversely impact patient health.  CABG Patients have been shown 
to have an elevated risk of depression and adverse physiological functioning in addition to increased risk 
of neurological complications such as stroke (Roach et al. 1996).  
In the late 1990s, an innovative new CABG procedure known as off-pump (or minimally 
invasive) CABG was developed that allowed surgeons to operate on the heart without having to stop and 
restart it. This procedure called for process-level changes (in particular, having to handle and make 
incisions on the beating heart) and increased surgical skill and dexterity. Specifically, surgeons must 
extensively study and learn this new procedure before practicing it.   
In this paper, we examine the learning curve for surgeons who perform this class of minimally 
invasive cardiac procedures. We chose this setting for several reasons. First, learning is a key driver of 
surgeon success. Second, we are able to examine clinical outcomes (success or failure) based on the 
cumulative volume of minimally invasive procedures performed by the surgeon. Third, a significant body 
of medical literature has examined the clinical drivers of success in cardiac surgery.  We can draw on this 
prior work to generate more accurate “risk-adjusted” measures of outcomes. We also draw on a growing 
management literature (e.g., Pisano et al. 2001; KC and Staats 2012) that has examined CABG. Fourth, 
we are able to collect data from early in the deployment of the CABG process, when the greatest learning 
likely occurred. The most significant of these minimally invasive procedures was introduced in 1998 
(Gardner 2001). We observe individual learning for every month beginning in October 1999 for a period 
of 120 months; therefore, our data set is comprehensive enough to accurately trace the learning curves for 
the surgeons in our sample.
2    
3.2 Data  
Our data set includes information on all of the minimally invasive cardiac procedures performed in 
Massachusetts from October 1999 to September 2009. This includes information about 6,570 minimally 
invasive procedures performed by 71 cardiac surgeons over the 10-year period. Fifty-four of the patient 
encounters had incomplete observations and missing covariates, leaving a total of 6,516 observations that 
we use in our analysis. Our outcome variable or quality measure is the in-hospital postoperative mortality 
rate, which is the most commonly used metric for benchmarking the performance of surgeons and 
institutions that perform cardiac surgery. Several patient-level factors have been shown to impact surgical 
outcomes, such as demographic variables, including age, gender, and race. Pre-existing risk factors, such 
as incidence of diabetes and poorly functioning bodily organs, are also known to affect outcomes (Nashef 
et al. 2002). To account for these risks, we include these patient-level factors in our analysis. We find that 
the average age of a patient undergoing a minimally invasive cardiac procedure is about 67 years 
                                                 
2 As noted by Lapré and Tsikriktsis (2006), studies that examine learning curves long after production has started are 
not biased.  They are, however, estimating learning rates for a latter part of the learning curve.   - 11 -
(standard deviation 11.2). The vast majority of patients have at least one significant accompanying 
clinical risk (e.g., cerebrovascular disease, neurologic or pulmonary risk, diabetes). 
Our analysis focuses on estimating learning from failure and successful experience. Since 
individual surgeon-level heterogeneity, such as reputation and training, could impact performance, we 
include the encrypted surgeon identifier and the unique patient-surgeon pairs in our analysis. Specifically, 
we observe the patient controls, the specific surgeon who operated on the patients, the level of experience 
the surgeons had accumulated by the time they performed the surgery, and the outcome of the surgery.  
In general, accurately estimating an individual worker’s learning curve is challenging for two 
reasons. First, perfecting a highly specialized task like a minimally invasive surgical procedure takes 
years. Since learning occurs over a long time horizon, an accurate estimation of individual learning curves 
calls for a long panel of observations. Second, data collection ideally should start at the beginning of the 
learning curve, when the surgeon first starts to perform the procedure, which is when the greatest learning 
is likely to occur. Our comprehensive data set allows us to overcome both of these challenges: we not 
only observe surgeon learning over a lengthy ten-year period but also begin the observations close to the 
introduction of the procedure into the marketplace. Because we include the surgeon identifier in our 
analysis, our estimates examine the effect of cumulative volume at the individual surgeon level. We also 
observe the hospitals where each surgeon practices. This allows us to generate a list of surgeons who 
practiced at the same hospital and estimate the effect of failures and successes of all other surgeons from 
that hospital.  This is our measure of others’ failures and successes, respectively.  Our empirical analysis 
also includes the hospital fixed effect, which accounts for effects of group membership on outcomes.   
3.3 Empirical Strategy  
In the discussions below, the subscript s denotes the surgeon, i denotes the patient, and t denotes time. 
The key outcome variable in our analyses, MORTist, equals 1 if patient i, who underwent a minimally 
invasive cardiac procedure performed by surgeon s at time t, died, and 0 otherwise. Multivariate logistic 
regression is widely used to model such binary outcomes in cardiac surgery (Nashef et al. 2002) and in 
the literature on operational productivity and quality of care (KC and Terwiesch 2009; KC and Staats 
2012). We use the vector Xit to denote patient-level covariates that are known to impact outcomes. In 
particular, Xit includes patient demographic factors as well as clinical risk factors. The vector Tt includes 
temporal factors, including the month and year of a procedure as well as its day of the week.  
Our primary explanatory variables are the cumulative volume of minimally invasive procedures 
performed by surgeon s at time t.  Specifically, we define the cumulative experience as follows: 
 
          ∑∑                     
 
       and 	          ∑∑          1               
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where        1  if surgeon s performed a minimally invasive cardiac procedure on patient i at time t
’ 
between the beginning of our study period (t0 ) and time t, and 0 otherwise. Also, SUCCit = 1 if the 
minimally invasive procedure performed on patient i at time t was successful, and         = 1 otherwise.  
ESUCCst and EFAILst are thus the cumulative volumes of successes and failures for surgeon s at time t, 
respectively.  Similarly, we define EFAIL_OTHERSst and ESUCC_OTHERSst to be the cumulative failures and 
successes of the other cardiac surgeons who work in the same hospital as surgeon s.   
To explore the impact of individual failures and successes, and those of others, we employ the 
following empirical specification.
3 
ln 
Pr          1 |    
1 P r           1 |    
 
                                                	        _        
         _                
 
Ss denotes the “surgeon fixed effect.” This allows us to account for unobserved surgeon-level 
heterogeneity, including reputation, training, and medical background. Because some surgeons practice at 
more than one hospital, we also include the hospital fixed effect, Hh, which allows us to account for 
unobserved hospital-level heterogeneity. The vector Tt includes temporal factors, including the time 
period when the surgery was performed (specifically, a unique identifier for the month and year of a 
procedure) as well as its day of the week. The time fixed effect allows us to account for any changes in 
the underlying technology over time. Our estimators of concern are β1 and β2, which capture the effect of 
an additional unit of experience (i.e., one more single cardiac procedure) from a success and failure for 
surgeon s in reducing the likelihood of risk-adjusted mortality for patient i at time t. εisht is the random 
error term. Likewise, β3 and β4 capture the effect of learning from the success or failure of a coworker in 
reducing the likelihood of risk-adjusted mortality for patient i at time t. A larger negative value for β1 as 
compared to β2 would provide support for hypothesis H1. Similarly, a larger negative value for β4 as 
compared to β3 would provide support for hypothesis H2. We note that the above specification follows a 
long line of research in cardiac risk stratification that link patient risk variables to outcomes using a 
logistic regression (see also, Parsonnet, Dean and Bernstein 1989; Higgins et al. 1992; Nashef et al. 
2002). We augment this prior work to examine the effect of cumulative individual failures and successes 
                                                 
3 We use counts of our experience variables, rather than their logs for two reasons. First, the log-linear learning 
curve model is derived from theory, and supported empirically while the log-log learning curve model is just from 
empirical results (Lapré, Mukherjee and Wassenhove 2000). Second, if experience has been gained prior to the start 
of the dataset then the log-log learning curve model will yield biased coefficients (Lapré and Tsikriktsis 2006). 
Some surgeons have experience prior to the start of our dataset and so a log-linear model is preferred.   - 13 -
as well as those of others.  
  We next consider the interaction effects that we hypothesized earlier: the moderating effect of 
individual success on individual failures, as well as the moderating effect of the failures of others on the 
failures of individuals. The following empirical specification includes these interaction terms: 
ln 
Pr          1 |    
1 P r           1 |    
 
                                                	        _        
         _                                                  _                
 
 
γ1 captures the interaction effect of individual successes and failures. A negative value for γ1 
would provide support for hypothesis H3. Similarly, γ2 captures the effect of synergy (or lack thereof) 
between individual failures and the failures of others. A negative value would provide support for 
hypothesis H4. 
Finally, for completeness, we use the empirical specification reported above, but include the 
interaction effect of individual and others’ successes: γ3 ESUCCst x ESUCC_OTHERSst. Attribution theory does 
not lead to a particular prediction for this coefficient. In this model, γ3 would capture the effect of any 
synergy between individual successes and others’ successes. If individuals are more likely to learn from 
collective successes, we would find a negative coefficient for the interaction (γ3 < 0); if the collective 
successes of others do not have such synergistic effects, then we would find a non-significant effect. 
 
4. Results  
Our first hypothesis predicted that an individual’s prior success would have a greater positive effect on 
the individual’s performance than her prior failure would. Note that as our dependent variable is patient 
mortality, a negative coefficient is related to lower predicted mortality and therefore to positive 
performance. To test our first hypothesis, we examined the impact of one’s own prior successes and 
failures on individual learning. As shown in Table 2, we find that individual failure does not lead to an 
improvement in surgical outcomes, as demonstrated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient 
of cumulative volume of minimally invasive surgical procedures (coefficient = 0.1709, p < 0.05). This 
corresponds to a decline in surgical performance by 76% for a standard deviation increase in the number 
of unsuccessful procedures for the surgeon.  By contrast, individual success is associated with improved 
surgical outcomes, as demonstrated by the negative and statistically significant effect for individual 
surgeon-related experience (coefficient = -0.00727, p < 0.05). This corresponds to an improvement in 
surgical outcome by a factor of 46% for a standard deviation increase in the number of successful 
procedures for the surgeon. The month and year fixed effects capture the effect of temporal improvements   - 14 -
(e.g., better technology) during the period of study. Therefore, our individual surgeon estimates are 
obtained from cumulative experience above and beyond these temporal factors. The patient-level controls, 
where statistically significant, all have the expected signs. The coefficients for the effects of individual 
prior successes and individual prior failures are statistically different; a Wald test rejected the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients for the impact of failure and success are equal (p = 0.02). This provides 
support for the hypothesis that individual prior success has a greater positive effect on performance than 
does individual prior failure.  On balance, however, increased experience does have a beneficial impact 
on outcomes.  Based on an alternative empirical specification, where we examine the impact of 
cumulative experience (regardless of outcome) on future outcomes, we find (Table A-1) the estimate of 
cumulative volume to be -0.00217 (p < 0.10). This corresponds to an improvement in surgical outcomes 
by a factor of 17.3% for a standard deviation increase in the volume of overall experience.   
Our second hypothesis predicted that the prior failures of other workers would have a greater 
effect on an individual’s performance than the prior successes of others would. We find that the failures 
of others (coefficient = -0.0354, p < 0.10) have a significant beneficial effect in improving outcomes of 
individual surgeons and that the successes of others does not show a statistically significant relationship 
(coefficient = -0.00019, p >0.10). This corresponds to an improvement in surgical outcomes by a factor of 
37.5% for a standard deviation increase in the failures of others.  To compare the magnitude of these two 
effects on individual learning, we tested the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the effect of a prior 
failure of another worker is no different from the coefficient that captures the effect of a prior success of 
another worker.  A Wald test rejected this null hypothesis (p = 0.08), leading to support for Hypothesis 2. 
Next, we examine our third hypothesis, which predicted that an individual’s prior failures and 
prior successes would have a positive, complementary effect on individual performance. To test this 
hypothesis, in Table 3 (Model 1) we include the interaction effects between individual successes and 
failures. As predicted, we find that with each additional success, a failure offers greater opportunity to 
learn (coefficient = -0.00189, p < .01). Finally, we consider the interaction effect of individual failures 
and the failures of others to test our last hypothesis, which predicted that an individual’s prior failures and 
the prior failures of others would have a positive, complementary effect on the individual’s performance. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find (Model 2) that individual failures and the failures of others 
interact to have a beneficial learning experience (estimate = - 0.00699, p < 0.01).  
Finally, for completeness, we also consider the interaction effect of individual successes and the 
successes of others even though we did not develop a specific hypothesis about this interaction. As shown 
in Model 4 of Table 3 (and in Model 3 without the other interactions), we do not find a statistically 
significant effect for this interaction term. Thus, it appears that an individual’s prior successes and the 
prior successes of others do not have a statistically significant effect on one’s own learning.    - 15 -
As a test of robustness for the effect of learning from individual failures and successes, we 
include a specification that includes quadratic terms for self-failure and self-success (Table A-II).   We 
find that the quadratic term for failures is positive and the quadratic term for success is negative.   The 
coefficients on the quadratic terms are not large enough to produce U-shaped effects within the range of 
the data.  However, they do suggest an attenuation of the effects of individual failures and successes over 
time. This result is different from that of Reagans et al. (2005), who find that performance first worsens 
with individual experience before improving. We note that Reagans et al. (2005) examine total experience 
(not success/failure) as well as inexperienced team members (residents or fellows). The surgeons in 
minimally invasive CABG are all board certified.  An interesting extension of our work would be to 
examine a setting with individuals new to the field in order to study whether they are more or less prone 
to the effects we identify than those with more experience.  
To rule out the possibility of patient selection as a possible driver of our results, we examined the 
correlation between patient preoperative risk and the failures of individual surgeons. This allows us to 
examine whether surgeons that fail operate on patients with greater risk factors. The preoperative risk was 
obtained by using the patient and procedural risk factors to predict the mortality rate.  We find a lack of 
statistically significant correlation between the preoperative mortality risk and the previous failures for a 
given surgeon (p = 0.419), which rules out the possibility of a statistically significant effect of patient 
selection or matching on observable factors. As an additional check of robustness, we estimate the 
cumulative successes and failures of surgeons at other hospitals. We then include these newly constructed 
measures in our empirical specification. We find that failures and successes at other hospitals do not have 
a statistically significant effect on a surgeon’s learning. This rules out the possibility of other industry- or 
technology-related confounders for our estimates.    
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
5.1 Discussion of Results 
Prior research on organizational learning has explored the effects of both prior success and failure, yet 
individuals are likely to learn differently from organizations. In this paper, we examined how individuals 
learn directly from their own past experience and indirectly from the past experience of others for both 
success and failure. We theorize and find evidence for a paradox of failure: individuals learn from the 
failures of others, but not from their own failures. Our empirical results add to existing research on 
individual learning in organizations and open up new questions for future research. First, we find that 
individuals not only learn more from their own successful experiences than from their own failure 
experiences, but that their performance worsens after failure. While our empirical design does not permit 
us to identify the mechanisms that drive this result, our underlying theory offers reasons for it. Attribution   - 16 -
theory suggests that after individuals fail, they may be less likely to put forth effort to learn on the same 
tasks because they tend to attribute that failure to external circumstances beyond their control, such as 
luck (Weiner 1974). However, assuming that the outcome was actually a joint function of both internal 
and external factors, then failure at least in part signals something has gone wrong. If an individual does 
not put forth effort to learn what has gone wrong, then he may continue using the incorrect strategy going 
forward and commit even further to the existing solution strategy, even if it is flawed (Staw 1981). This 
escalation of commitment to a flawed strategy creates the possibility not only of consistently poor 
performance, but of actually performing worse over time. Future work should seek to understand this 
worsening of performance in more detail. 
A second question is how our results compare with existing studies of success and failure at the 
organization level of analysis. Some prior studies have shown that learning from success has a stronger 
effect than learning from failure (Baum and Dahlin 2007), while others have demonstrated the opposite: 
namely, that learning from failure has a stronger effect than learning from success (Li and Rajagopalan 
1997; Madsen and Desai 2010). Though we cannot answer the question conclusively, our study offers 
some insight on these seemingly inconsistent findings. In particular, our results show that both 
performance improvement and performance degradation occur within the same organization (a hospital) 
in response to an individual’s failure. While the focal individual does not learn from his or her mistakes, 
others in the organization appear to do so.  
In order to understand the effects of individual actions on organizational learning, scholars must 
be careful not to anthropomorphize the organization as they develop and test their theories. 
Organizational learning cannot be attributed to a single individual’s action, because both the focal 
individual and others in the organization observe and respond to events taking place within it. This is 
consistent with existing research describing organizations as interpretation systems that attempt to 
decipher what occurs within them (Daft and Weick 1984; Levitt and March 1988). One implication of this 
view is that, in order to understand the effect of success or failure on a firm, it may be necessary to know 
who the actors were both before and after an event occurs. For example, if managers in the railroad 
context of Baum and Dahlin (2007) kept their jobs after a failure occurred, then possible learning from the 
failure might not be captured. This would not only prevent organizational learning but could worsen 
performance, as the researchers find. On the other hand, if the unsuccessful project managers in Madsen 
and Desai’s (2010) orbital launch context were fired after experiencing failure, this might translate to 
successful organizational learning, as the other managers could observe and learn from the failure. 
Madsen and Desai (2010) also find that, counter to the idea of small losses (Sitkin 1992), bigger failures 
lead to more organizational learning. This finding is consistent with the managerial turnover hypothesis,   - 17 -
as larger failures might increase the likelihood of a manager being fired, which might then lead to greater 
organizational learning.  
While these are only speculations, they highlight the many factors that may determine how an 
organization made up of individuals may learn from success and failure. Further insight could be gained 
by studying the broad organization’s response to failure as well as specific responses, such as those of 
central actors in the organization. The behavioral theory of the firm explicitly details how organizational 
processes are compromises between rival factions within an organization (March and Simon 1993). Given 
that fact, it is important to understand when a failure may lead to a shift in power between factions and 
result in different interpretations, learning, and outcomes for the organization (Levitt and March 1988). 
Overall, our findings highlight the need for a multi-level view of organizational learning. 
Our work also identifies potentially fruitful directions for future research on the effect of success 
and failure on individual learning. As noted by earlier research, prior experience may have a varying 
impact on both the effort and search strategy of the actor. This suggests a mediation model where a 
previous outcome leads to a subsequent effort decision followed by a search strategy and then a repetition 
of the activity. Each of these links is worth additional study, both in the laboratory (through controlled 
experiments) and in the field. Attribution theory suggests that individual failure may reduce effort in 
subsequent searches. Failure could potentially improve the search strategy, but not without effort. By 
studying this model in more detail, future work can not only gain additional insight into the micro-
mechanisms explaining individual learning but also identify moderators that may help (or hurt) at each 
stage. 
Finally, further work is needed to clarify how moderating variables affect how individuals 
internalize failure. We find that individuals with a greater number of prior successes are more able to 
learn from their failures than are those with fewer successes, a result consistent with the findings of Kim 
et al. (2009) at the organizational level. Our effect may be a result of reduced self-threat, additional 
knowledge, or associative learning. In addition to exploring these mechanisms, future research could 
explore how factors of the task, such as difficulty, uncertainty, or ambiguity, might affect an individual’s 
learning from either success or failure.   
Additionally, our moderation results suggest that a greater number of failures by others help 
individuals learn from their own failures. Future work could examine the drivers behind this effect. It 
could be that this result is explained by how an individual views the opportunity provided by failure (e.g., 
to become a star by solving a difficult problem) or by whether greater failure helps create a culture where 
failure is seen as an opportunity to learn. Work examining the role of intra-group factors such as 
psychological safety on the propensity to learn from failure (Edmondson 1999) would also prove 
valuable. In psychologically safe teams, individuals are willing to take risks, as they know that these risks   - 18 -
will not be held against them, and the team accepts the possibility of failure. By building a culture of 
psychological safety, organizations and teams alike can assure that members will be more willing and 
likely to take risks, but it is unclear whether such efforts can also increase members’ self-reflection and 
willingness to learn from their failures. Additionally, future research could examine in what other ways 
managers might intervene to build cultures that can learn from failure. For example, the onboarding 
process for new workers, during which workers negotiate their identities and shape their expectations of 
the firm, could offer a key opportunity to accomplish such an objective. 
5.2 Limitations  
Although our findings are robust to various empirical specifications, there are limitations that should be 
noted. To start with we are able to track the detailed chronological experience of all individuals in the 
state of Massachusetts that completed the minimally invasive surgical procedure over a ten-year period of 
time. However, we do not have information on the first year of the rollout of the procedure. While our 
models are not biased in their estimation, future work with more data would be valuable. Also, while we 
can identify whether one success or failure occurred before another, we cannot know what information 
individuals actually observed among one another. Prior work at the organizational level suggests that 
organizations may under-sample failures and therefore draw incorrect conclusions (Denrell 2003). While 
our reported results are statistically valid, future work should explore what knowledge is known and 
shared under different conditions and also seek to identify the precise micro-mechanisms at work.  
Next, we focus our attention on one particular performance outcome, the quality of the surgery. 
While this measure is commonly used in healthcare settings (e.g., Huckman and Pisano 2006; KC and 
Staats 2012) and is clearly an important one given the stakes involved, future work could explore the 
relationships studied here using other outcome measures. For instance, using data from software projects, 
one could use time of project completion and delivery as compared to predetermined deadlines as the 
performance measure. Similarly, in service settings, one could use customer satisfaction as the outcome 
measure. In addition, a potential concern with a model such as ours with a lagged dependent variable in 
the equation is dynamic panel bias (Nickell 1981). This problem is particularly troublesome with large n 
and small T. However, in our dataset with a large T, any potential bias from the least squares estimator 
should be negligible (Judson and Owen 1999). Future work could use an exogenous shock to examine this 
point in more detail.  
We also note that the surgical process is not completed by only the surgeon; other individuals in 
the operating room provide assistance. However, the cardiothoracic surgeon is responsible for executing 
the critical surgical processes on the heart. As is the case in other healthcare studies, we have information 
about surgeons but not the rest of the surgery team (e.g., Reagans et al. 2005; Huckman and Pisano 2006).   - 19 -
Given prior work noting that shared experience among team members can improve performance 
(Huckman, Staats and Upton 2009; Huckman and Staats 2011), an interesting future extension of this 
work would be to explore how familiarity among team members affects our reported results.  
Additionally, prior work suggests that the effects from attribution theory are stronger in more 
individualistic cultures as compared to more collective cultures – for example, Western cultures as 
compared to Eastern cultures (Gilbert and Malone 1995). Future work should seek to explore how 
learning from failure or success operates in different cultures.  
Further, in our setting we are able to clearly distinguish between failures (i.e., the patient dies 
after surgery) and successes (i.e., the patient survives). However, there are other sub-categories of success 
and failure that warrant further study. One of them is “near misses,” defined as an experience that was 
almost a failure but ended up as a success. Prior research suggests that, as in the case of failures, 
organizations often fail to learn from near-misses (Dillon and Tinsley 2008). While our data does not 
provide us with information on near-misses, future research examining when and how individuals learn 
from near-misses in real-world settings and in healthcare in particular would be valuable. A second 
subcategory is that of expected rather than unexpected failures and successes. For instance, in a healthcare 
context, expected failure may result from a complicated case that went wrong, while unexpected failure 
may result from an easy case that went wrong. Examining the consequences for individual learning of 
both expected and unexpected failures (as well as successes) could be valuable. The mortality rate in our 
data is 3%, a small number that limits our ability to split the sample to distinguish between expected and 
unexpected failures, and draw valid statistical inferences. It is possible that the effects of attribution 
theory would be heightened for an individual’s own expected failure and weakened for unexpected 
failure. Future research also could investigate other contexts where expected and unexpected failures (or 
success) are equally likely. One such context is sports, where teams often have information about the 
competitors they play and can form expectations about their likelihood of winning. An additional, related 
question for further examination involves the probability of success versus failure. In our setting, success 
is more likely than failure. How might our results change if success was rare and failure was common 
(e.g., searching for a cure for cancer)? 
In addition, surgeons may be affiliated with different medical groups serving each hospital. We 
have no information about individual’s medical group affiliation. Although this lack of detail should not 
bias our results, examining a setting where this data is recorded could be informative as learning often 
occurs within the smallest group. An eighth limitation is related to individual differences across surgeons. 
While we have anonymous surgeon identifiers in our dataset in order to control for individual-level fixed 
effects, it is possible that specific individual differences among surgeons could provide further 
explanatory power in our regressions. We do not have such information, but future work could examine   - 20 -
whether factors such as gender or educational background have differential effects for the relationships 
we investigated. 
Finally, we control for individual and hospital fixed effects as well as patient preoperative risk, 
however we cannot rule out the possibility that there may be unobserved, time-varying heterogeneity in 
individual or organizational accident proneness or preoperative patient risk.  Surgeons who operate in 
accident-prone environments or who treat more risky patients are likely to have more adverse outcomes, 
but (by attribution theory) are also more like to attribute their failure to their external circumstances.  This 
kind of justification may mean that these surgeons learn less from failures than do surgeons who are less 
accident prone and who treat less risky patients.  Because our data limitations preclude us from testing 
this possibility, we present it as an area for future research.   
5.3 Theoretical Contributions and Managerial Implications 
Our research has implications for healthcare and for organizations more generally. Recent studies 
suggest that, despite the increased focus on medical errors and investigation, hospitals are not getting 
safer (Landrigan et al. 2010). While we cannot draw a causal connection from our results to this finding, 
by improving individuals’ ability to learn from prior experience, it may be possible to improve future 
outcomes. Given that performance in healthcare is quite literally a matter of life and death, it is important 
for individuals to learn from both their successes and failures. Existing inquiry boards and the potential 
for legal liability may complicate the ability of an individual to learn from his own failures. In particular, 
instead of focusing on how to learn from a mistake, an individual may have an increased incentive to 
explain away the mistake. While existing systems may help others learn from an individual’s failure, it is 
necessary to design systems that help an individual learn from his own failure. As discussed by 
Edmondson (2011), for such systems to succeed, leaders must play a key role in helping individuals feel 
safe about admitting their responsibility for failure and learning from that failure. 
We make several theoretical contributions to research in operations management, organizational 
learning, and healthcare. First, as work grows increasingly more fragmented and specialized, the role of 
individuals in understanding organizational learning increases in importance (Staats and Gino 2012). By 
focusing on individuals, we gain a more nuanced understanding of how success and failure influence 
performance in organizations. Drawing on attribution theory, we hypothesize and find that individuals 
learn more from their own success than from their own failure rather than the opposite. To underscore the 
point, we find that performance can improve or degrade within an organization in response to the same 
event (a failure). Second, research on vicarious learning notes the challenges that may come from trying 
to learn from others (e.g., Bresman 2010). Our research contributes to this line of work by examining the 
sometimes beneficial and sometimes complicating factor of attributions. We find that the failure of others   - 21 -
has a greater positive effect on individual performance than does others’ successful experience. Third, we 
examine how one’s own prior experience and the experience of others can alter the failure to learn from 
failure. Our results show that certain types of experience help to counteract individuals’ errors of 
attribution and thus make them more open to learning from their failures. Together, our results advance 
our understanding of individual learning by drawing on research in psychology on attribution theory. Our 
findings also offer a call for future work to build more integrative theories of learning in organizations 
that capture not only the activities at one level (e.g., individual or organizational), but also how they 
interact to lead to performance improvement and performance degradation.    - 22 -
Tables 
Table I 
Patient Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean Standard Deviation  Median
Risk Adjusted Mortality  0.0353 0.06625 0.0122
Age  67.53 11.16 69
Gender (Female = 1)  0.287 0.453 0
Charlson Score    0.909 1.034 1
Cerebrovascular Disease    0.0904 0.287 0
COPD
  0.157 0.364 0
Diabetes  0.290 0.454 0
Diabetes with Complications  0.0517 0.221 0
Chronic Renal Failure    0.050 0.218 0
Incidence of Myocardial 
Infarction 
0.292 0.454 0
PTCA  0.0395 0.195 0
N=6516 Patients 
Table II 
Effects of Cumulative Successes and Failures on Outcome 
 
  (1) (2) 
Individual Cumulative Failure  0.1709 (0.077) ** 0.257 (0.08) ***
Individual Cumulative Success  -0.00727 (0.0036) ** -0.0108 (0.005) **
Others’ Cumulative Failure  -0.0354 (0.0197) * -0.040 (0.023) *
Others’ Cumulative Success  -0.00019 (0.00162)  0.0012 (0.0016) 
Surgeon Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Hospital Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect (Month, Year)  Yes No 
Day of Week  Yes Yes 
Patient Race    Yes Yes 
Patient Age  Yes Yes 
Patient Gender   Yes Yes 
Charlson Score    Yes Yes 
Cerebrovascular Disease    Yes Yes 
COPD
  Yes Yes 
Diabetes  Yes Yes 
Diabetes with Complications  Yes Yes 
Chronic Renal Failure  Yes Yes 
PTCA   Yes Yes 
Previous Myocardial Infarction  Yes Yes 
Length of Stay  Yes Yes 
Number of Vessels Bypassed  Yes Yes 
Likelihood Ratio (Pro > ChiSq)  < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
N = 6516 Asymptotic standard errors clustered by surgeon in parentheses * 10% Statistical Significance, ** 5 % 
Statistical Significance, *** 1 % Statistical Significance   - 23 -
Table III 
 
Interaction Effect of Cumulative Successes and Failures on Outcome 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)
Individual Cumulative 
Failure 
0.521
(0.099) *** 
0.458
(0.139) *** 
0.524
(0.166) *** 
0.707
(0.159) *** 
Individual Cumulative 
Success 
0.00097
(0.00378)  
-0.00951 
(0.00336)***  
-0.00931 
(0.003) *** 
-0.0109 
(0.00933) 
Others’ Cumulative 
Failure 
- 0.0263
(0.022)  
0.014
(0.0223)  
0.022
(0.0197)  
0.013
(0.0288) 
Others’ Cumulative 
Success 
-0.0076 
(0.00163)  
-0.00015 
(0.00017)  
0.00254 
(0.00179)  
-0.00216 
(0.00299) 
Individual Cum. Success 
x Individual Cum. Failure 
-0.00189 
(0.0003) *** 
- - -0.0014
(0.0006) ** 
Individual Cum. Failure x 
Others’ Cum. Failure 
-  -0.00699 
(0.00226)*** 
- -0.00618 
(0.0034) * 
Individual Cum. Success 
x Others’ Cum. Success 
-  - -0.000006 
(0.000009) 
0.000013 
(0.000015) 
Surgeon Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect 
(Month, Year) 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Day of Week  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Patient Race    Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Patient Age  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Patient Gender  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Charlson Score    Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Cerebrovascular Disease  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
COPD
  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Diabetes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Diabetes with 
Complications 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Chronic Renal Failure  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
PTCA   Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Previous Myocardial 
Infarction 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Length of Stay  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Number of Vessels 
Bypassed 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood Ratio (Pro > 
ChiSq) 
< 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001  < 0.0001
 
N = 6516 Asymptotic standard errors clustered by surgeon in parentheses * 10% Statistical Significance, ** 5 % 
Statistical Significance, *** 1 % Statistical Significance   - 24 -
Table A-I 
Effects of Cumulative Volume on Outcome 
 
  (1) (2) 
Individual Cumulative Volume  - 0.00217 (0.0012) * - 0.00187 (0.001) *
Surgeon Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Hospital Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect (Month, Year)  Yes No 
Day of Week  Yes Yes 
Patient Race    Yes Yes 
Patient Age  Yes Yes 
Patient Gender   Yes Yes 
Charlson Score    Yes Yes 
Cerebrovascular Disease    Yes Yes 
COPD
  Yes Yes 
Diabetes  Yes Yes 
Diabetes with Complications  Yes Yes 
Chronic Renal Failure  Yes Yes 
PTCA   Yes Yes 
Previous Myocardial Infarction  Yes Yes 
Length of Stay  Yes Yes 
Number of Vessels Bypassed  Yes Yes 
Likelihood Ratio (Pro > ChiSq)  < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
N = 6516 Asymptotic standard errors clustered by surgeon in parentheses * 10% Statistical Significance, ** 5 % 
Statistical Significance, *** 1 % Statistical Significance 
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Table A-II 
Robustness Test 
 
  (1)
Individual Cumulative Failure 0.903 (0.163) *** 
Individual Cumulative Success -0.0314 (0.009) *** 
Others’ Cumulative Failure - 0.0384 (0.020) *  
Others’ Cumulative Success 0.00028 (0.0018)  
Individual Cum. Failure Sq. -0.0314 (0.0087) *** 
Individual Cum. Success Sq. 0.000048 (0.0000) *** 
Surgeon Fixed Effect  Yes
Hospital Fixed Effect  Yes
Time Fixed Effect (Month, Year) Yes
Day of Week  Yes
Patient Race    Yes
Patient Age  Yes
Patient Gender  Yes
Charlson Score    Yes
Cerebrovascular Disease  Yes
COPD
  Yes
Diabetes  Yes
Diabetes with Complications Yes
Chronic Renal Failure  Yes
PTCA   Yes
Previous Myocardial Infarction Yes
Length of Stay  Yes
Number of Vessels Bypassed Yes
Likelihood Ratio (Pro > ChiSq) < 0.0001
N = 6516 Asymptotic standard errors clustered by surgeon in parentheses * 10% Statistical Significance, ** 5 % 
Statistical Significance, *** 1 % Statistical Significance 
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